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ABSTRACT
EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF CHILD CARE POLICIES ON
CHILDREN’S COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND MATERNAL LABOR
SUPPLY
Andrew S. Griffen
Petra Todd
To explore the role of child care policies in the development of early cognitive skills, I
embed a value-added cognitive achievement production function into a dynamic, dis-
crete choice model of maternal labor supply and child care decisions. I use the model
to explore how two types of child care policies, Head Start and child care price subsi-
dies, affect child care use and quality decisions and how those decisions in turn affect
cognitive achievement. To estimate the model, I use rich panel data from the Early
Childhood Longitudinal Survey - Birth cohort (ECLS-B). There are three key findings:
(1) Expanding Head Start to children who are currently not eligible has beneficial ef-
fects on cognitive achievement, because even children from relatively high quality home
environments spend significant amounts of time in low quality child care. An universal
expansion of Head Start increases average cognitive achievement scores by 0.21 stan-
dard deviations at kindergarten entry. (2) For the typical subsidy-eligible population,
child care subsidies have small positive effects on cognitive skills by inducing children
from low quality home environments to enter relatively higher quality child care envi-
ronments. Six months of exposure to a subsidy program increases cognitive achievement
scores by .036 standard deviations on average. (3) Without Head Start the black-white
achievement gap at kindergarten entry increases by 9 percent and child care subsidies
decrease the black-white achievement gap at kindergarten entry by 3 percent.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Early cognitive achievement test scores are important because early test scores
have been shown to be related to later achievement test scores, final educational
attainment and labor market success (Currie and Thomas, 1999; Chetty et al.,
2010). Policies to improve cognitive skills or to close early racial or socioeconomic
cognitive achievement gaps become costlier as children age and interventions are
more effective in early childhood (Heckman and Masterov, 2007). Theories of
childhood development emphasize that stimulating environments foster the de-
velopment of cognitive skills (Case, 1992), which implies that policies to improve
cognitive skills should focus on where children spend time and the quality of those
environments. In the U.S., children spend on average a substantial fraction of
time outside the home, even at young ages. Among 9 month old children, for
example, 49.7% spent some time in child care and those children spent on aver-
age 32.25 hours / week in nonparental care.1 Research consistently finds positive
associations between child test score outcomes and child care quality (Love et al.,
1996), so improving child care experiences is seen as a potentially effective means
of improving cognitive skills for at risk children.
In this paper, I study the effectiveness of two kinds of child care policies, Head
Start and child care price subsidies, both how the policies affect children’s child
care experiences and their subsequent effects on cognitive skills. Head Start is a
1Author’s calculations, Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey - Birth Cohort (ECLS-B).
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free, federally funded preschool program for poor children that aims to “promote
school readiness by enhancing the social and cognitive development of children.”2
A randomized controlled trial of Head Start demonstrated that the program has
positive effects on cognitive achievement at kindergarten entry that fade-out by
1st grade (Head Start Impact Study 2005), which has led to calls to cut Head Start
funding or to change how Head Start is implemented.3 In the face of budgetary
pressure, understanding who should be eligible for Head Start and how to design
Head Start to improve cognitive skills are important questions to answer in order
to improve the program’s effectiveness.4
The second type of policy that I study, child care price subsidies, provided
through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), give income eligible
working mothers a voucher for child care services. Child care price subsidies are
designed primarily to support the labor force participation of women (Adams
and Rohacek 2002). How to incorporate child development goals into the design
of child care subsidies has been an issue at least since the the 1970s (Heckman
1974). Child care subsidies have an ambiguous impact on child outcomes because
the subsidies can simultaneously increase the demand for child care quality, which
improves cognitive skills, and incentivize the use of child care, which can lower
cognitive skills if the home environment is more productive. Recent reduced form
2For the quote, see the program description at the Office of Head Start website.
3See the discussion during the recent budget debate: “Cuts to Head
Start Show Challenge of Fiscal Restraint” in the NY Times March 10, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/us/politics/11headstart.html
4See Gibbs, Ludwig and Miller (2011) for a discussion about “fade out” and whether fade out
perhaps represents catch up. In a Cunha-Heckman production function with complementarities
over time, another possibility is that fade out is a result of lack of investment in the post
kindergarten period. In this case, Head Start might still be the correct type of intervention
but the optimal policy might space investment out over more periods for Head Start eligible
children. There is also evidence that Head Start has longer term impacts on noncognitive
outcomes (See Garces et al., 2002; Ludwig and Miller, 2007; Deming, 2009). To the extent
that cognitive impacts are correlated with noncognitive impacts, analyzing the impact of Head
Start design and coverage on cognitive outcomes would still be applicable.
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empirical research indicates that subsidies have a harmful effect on children’s cog-
nitive outcomes (Herbst and Tekin 2010; Hawkinson, Griffen, Dong and Maynard,
2011). An open question is to understand the mechanisms through which child
care subsidies affect children’s cognitive achievement, to elucidate how child care
subsidy policy parameters affect choices and to reassess the design of subsidies.
To investigate the effects of these two child care policies on cognitive achieve-
ment and maternal labor supply, I embed a cognitive achievement production
function into a dynamic discrete choice model of child care and maternal labor
supply decisions. In each model period (every six months), mothers receive a
wage offer and a price-quality offer for child care services. Fathers, when present,
contribute to household income. Eligible families have an additional Head Start
quality offer in their choice set. The mother makes decisions about whether to
stay home, work part-time or work full-time and, for up to two children age 5
or less, whether to use child care part-time, full-time, or not at all. The time
spent in child care, the quality of child care and the quality of the home environ-
ment are inputs into the value-added cognitive achievement production function.
The child’s cognitive skills and the mother’s labor market experience evolve en-
dogenously and the mother faces trade-offs between consumption, leisure, the
cognitive development of her children and the accumulation of labor market ex-
perience. Mothers in the model face uncertainty in the form of shocks to wage
offers, husband’s income, the cognitive skills of children, home quality, the price
and quality of child care, and preferences for leisure and child care. Marital status
and fertility are modeled as stochastic processes.
A dynamic model is a natural setting for examining both the short-term and
long-term effects of alternative child care policies. Cognitive skills develop over
time and the value-added cognitive achievement production function captures the
3
dynamic nature of skill accumulation (Cunha and Heckman 2007, 2008). Female
labor market experience also accumulates over time. When making a labor supply
decision, the mother weighs not only current consumption and leisure but also the
effect of working on future labor market experience and her children’s cognitive
achievement. On child care policy, Blau (1999) emphasizes “the trade-off faced
by policymakers between the goals of improving child well-being and increasing
economic self-sufficiency.” Heckman (1974) discusses how the evaluation of child
care subsidy programs is complicated not only by the fact that subsidies have
work requirements but also because different features of the subsidies change
who participates and what decisions they make. My modeling approach allows a
realistic representation of different child care policy parameters and constraints
and of how they influence program participant outcomes.
To estimate the model, I use data from the ECLS-B, a nationally represen-
tative panel of 14,000 children born in the United States in 2001. Children were
followed until kindergarten entry and extensive information was collected about
the children’s home environments, child care environments and scores on cog-
nitive assessments. I define and measure the “quality” of the child’s home and
child care environments in a way that is consistent with other early childhood
research. The data also contain information on the wages and labor force partic-
ipation decisions of mothers, husbands’ income, hours spent in child care, prices
paid for child care services, marital status and other characteristics of the child’s
parents.
I estimate the model parameters using the Method of Simulated Moments
(McFadden 1989). I simulate the model and match statistics from the simu-
lated data to statistics from the ECLS-B. Although the model contains multiple
children per family, the data only contain information on a single child. To ad-
4
dress this limitation, I use an unconditional simulation approach that simulates
mothers from their first birth. I integrate over unobserved elements of the states-
pace and mimic the ECLS-B sample selection procedure by selecting sequences
of shocks such that the mother has a birth in the same year that the ECLS-B
collected data. I compare predictions of the model about the intra-sibling cor-
relation of cognitive skills and birth order effects on cognitive skills to evidence
from external data sets.
Using the estimated model, I study the effects of Head Start on the cogni-
tive achievement of children. As a model validation exercise, I evaluate Head
Start in my model using the design of the Head Start Impact Study (HSIS), a
randomized controlled trial of Head Start. The results are consistent with those
of the HSIS. I also use the model to perform evaluations of changes to Head
Start including removing Head Start for two years (an arm that the HSIS did
not evaluate) and replacing Head Start with equivalent cash transfers to eligible
families. I find that in-kind transfers through Head Start increase cognitive skills
at kindergarten entry by 0.13 standard deviations relative to providing parents
with the money directly. I then evaluate the effects of expanding Head Start ser-
vices to current non-eligible recipients. I find that increasing Head Start access
improves cognitive achievement because many non-eligible children spend signif-
icant amounts of time in low quality child care. In particular, a universal Head
Start program increases average cognitive achievement scores by 0.15 standard
deviations at kindergarten entry. I also document that the current Head Start
program helps to close the black-white achievement gap; without Head Start, the
current black-white achievement gap would be 9 percent larger at kindergarten
entry. This finding reflects both the relative productivity of Head Start compared
to other forms of child care and the differential access to Head Start by black
5
children, because of family income eligibility cutoffs.
I then use the model to study the effects of child care price subsidies on
cognitive achievement and maternal labor force participation. In contrast to
previous research, I find that for the typical subsidy-eligible population, child
care subsidies have small positive effect on cognitive skills by inducing families to
move children from low quality home environments to relatively higher quality
child care environments. Six months of an offer of a child care subsidy program
increases cognitive achievement scores by .043 standard deviations on average. I
then consider changes to the design of the subsidy programs, by changing income
eligibility cutoffs, the maximum reimbursement rate and family copayments, and
document how these policy parameters affect cognitive skills, maternal labor
supply, coverage and cost. I find that the most effective combination of policy
parameters to improve cognitive skills targets the program to the very poor, sets
the copay to 0 and makes the reimbursement rate generous. I also find that
this configuration of program parameters has a large impact on maternal labor
force participation, increasing labor supply by 36 percentage points. For the very
poor, there do not appear to be trade-offs between labor supply and cognitive
achievement goals. Finally, I find that child care subsidies can have a small
positive effect on closing the black-white cognitive achievement gap. Specifically,
I find that 6 months of a child care subsidy decreases the black-white achievement
gap by 1.4 percent. The result obtains because black mothers are more likely to be
eligible for subsidies based on their family income. The effect of using child care
on cognitive achievement is potentially larger for black children than for white
children. Black mothers offer lower home quality on average, so that the subsidy
differentially increases the cognitive skills of black children who are induced into
child care.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review the related literature.
I present the model in section 3 and discuss my measurement system for child care
and home quality in section 4. I discuss the data in section 5 and the estimation
in section 6. In section 7, I review institutional details about child care subsidy
policy in the U.S. and discuss in detail how I incorporate subsidies into the model.
Section 8 describes the estimation results, section 9 presents the counterfactual
results and section 10 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Literature
My paper contributes to a large literature on the cognitive achievement of chil-
dren, child care subsidies, Head Start, and female labor supply. A multidisci-
plinary literature in psychology, education and economics examines the effect
of child care use and quality on cognitive achievement outcomes. Love et al.
(1996) present a review of this research and its findings that child care quality
is positively associated with child cognitive achievment. Blau (2000) provides an
extensive review of child care subsidy programs. Heckman (2006) argues for the
use of early interventions to improve both cognitive and noncognitive outcomes
of children.5 Child care policies are one such policy intervention. The quality of
the home environment predicts child outcomes across a wide range of studies and
empirical strategies (Bradley and Caldwell, 1980; Leibowitz, 1974; Murnane et
al. 1981; Todd and Wolpin, 2007; Cunha and Heckman 2008). Todd and Wolpin
(2003) and Cunha and Heckman (2007) discuss theoretical issues on modeling
the cognitive achievement production function. Blau and Currie (2006) have
an extensive review of child care policies, a theoretical discussion of the effects
of subsidies and an empirical survey of the literature. Blau and Currie call for
research that studies both the take-up of child care subsidies and interactions be-
tween the public and private provision of child care services. Almond and Currie
(2011) survey a large literature on the development of human capital before age
5See also Carneiro and Heckman (2003); Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov (2006);
Cunha and Heckman (2010).
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5 including early child care interventions.
This paper builds on the work of Bernal (2008) who also estimates a dynamic
discrete choice model of maternal labor supply and child care decisions that in-
corporates the cognitive achievement of children.6 She estimates the effects of
child care time inputs and maternal employment on the cognitive achievement
of children for married women with only one child in NLSY-79 and finds that an
additional year of child care and maternal employment reduces cognitive achieve-
ment test scores by -0.13 standard deviations. My paper extends her work in a
number of important dimensions. First, Bernal focuses on child care time inputs
but I focus on both child care time and quality decisions in the choice set and
the production function, which brings the model much closer to the frontier in
the child development literature. Bernal suggests incorporating child care qual-
ity into this class of models as an important qualifier to her empirical findings.
Although I use my model to evaluate a much more specific class of child care
policies, I discuss the similarity and differences between our findings in the re-
sults section. Second, besides child care quality, I allow a much richer choice
set for the mothers; more hours of work decisions, more hours of child care de-
cisions and the possibility of using Head Start, which is a prominent child care
option for low-income families. Third, I include the possibility of both divorce
and future fertility in the model, which not only expands the estimation sample
but importantly changes how mothers value their expected future utility when
making child care and employment decisions.
6Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall (2010) also estimate a behavioral model with a cognitive
achievement production. They focus on maternal and paternal time inputs as opposed to child
care inputs and do not model heterogeneity in either home inputs or child care inputs. The ideal
model would be a synthesis of these models that not only incorporates child care, employment,
hours of home inputs but that would also recognize the heterogeneity in both children’s child
care and home experiences.
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I contribute to a small literature in economics on estimating cognitive achieve-
ment production functions with child care inputs. Bernal and Keane (2010)
estimate a cognitive achievement production function jointly a model of child
care choices and find that an additional year of child care and maternal em-
ployment reduces cognitive achievement by -0.14 standard deviations. Bernal
and Keane (2011) estimate a cognitive achievement production function using
exogenous changes in welfare eligibility and find negative effects of child care use
on cognitive achievement. They also report that the effect depends on the type
of care with formal care having no negative impact on cognitive achievement.
Duncan (2003) estimates the impact of child care quality on cognitive outcomes
and finds effect sizes of 0.04 - 0.08 on the impact of child care quality on child
outcomes. Blau (1997) estimates the effect of so-called “structural” measures
of child care quality such as staff-child ratio and caregiver qualifications and
reports that structural measures of quality have no consistent impact on child
outcomes. His results suggest that regulation of child care through more easily
observed structural measures of quality is not a fruitful strategy to improve child
outcomes.7 The interpretation of these results is that (1) child care on average
negatively impacts cognitive skills, (2) some forms of child care such as more
formal child care arrangements do not negatively impact cognitive achievement
skills, (3) conditional on the number of hours of child care, improving the quality
of child care experiences increases cognitive achievement and (4) process quality
and not structural quality is the important feature of a child care environment.8
7On the other hand, Hotz and Xiao (2011) directly investigate the effects of child care regu-
lations on child care quality and find that regulations increase child care quality (as measured
by accrediation) and reduce the number of child care providers. These result would suggest that
the cognitive skills for children in child care would increase and the cognitive skills of children
crowded out of using child care could increase or decrease depending on the quality of their
home or of an alternative child care provider not affected by regulation (such as a relative).
8I discuss the distinction between process and structural measures of quality in the section
10
My work also contributes to the literature on child care subsidies and cognitive
achievement. Both Herbst and Tekin (2010 a,b) and Hawkinson, Griffen, Dong
and Maynard (2010) find negative impacts of subsidy receipt on child outcomes
after controlling for unobserved determinants of achievement (Herbst and Tekin)
and lagged achievement (Hawkinson et al). Neither paper explores the determi-
nants of subsidy receipt nor the mechanisms through which subsidy receipt may
affect cognitive achievement. These paper do not relate the design of child care
subsidy to child outcomes or quantify the trade-offs between encouraging labor
supply and improving cognitive achievement. Moreover, the negative impact of
subsidy receipt on child outcomes is in conflict with some previous research in
the literature including experimental evidence on child care vouchers (Huston
et al. 2001). My model permits a realistic representation of child care policy
parameters and constraints and I connect those policy parameters to both child
cognitive achievement outcomes and maternal labor supply decisions.
Head Start has been an extensively evaluated program including a random-
ized controlled trial (Head Start Impact Study 2005) and a rigorous observational
study using a within sibling estimation strategy (Currie and Thomas 1995). My
model contributes to the Head Start literature by considering the effect of the
existing Head Start program on a new population (if Head Start is expanded)
or replacing Head Start with cash transfers (to test whether in-kind transfers or
cash have larger impacts on cognitive skills). A model both clarifies the assump-
tions needed to estimate the effects of such programs, allows realistic modeling of
eligibility constraints, and predicts how individuals will value a new good (Head
Start) not previously in their choice set.
on Child Care and Home Quality.
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Chapter 3
Model
Description
The model begins when a mother first has a child and ends when she turns 45.
Mothers can be married (or not), face the risk of divorce and can have more
children as they age. Every 6 months the the mother makes a labor force deci-
sion and child care arrangement decisions for her children. For her labor supply
decision, the mother receives a wage offer that depends on her characteristics and
she can either stay home, work part-time or work full-time. For child care, the
mother chooses, for each child younger than five, whether they attend child care
part-time, full-time or stay at home. I define “child care” as any type of non-
parental care and I define “home care” as care given by one of the child’s parents
in the child’s home.9 In the model, child care varies in both quality and price.
Families make a draw from the price/quality distribution for child care services
and can choose whether to use child care at that price and quality. Children from
eligible families also have the option to attend Head Start, which offers free child
care for children from poor families. In the model, mothers face a skill produc-
tion function with the quality of child care, the time spent in child care, and the
quality of the home environment entering as inputs. The child’s cognitive skills
9Under this definition, child care encompasses relative care in the child’s home, relative care
outside the child’s home, non-relative care in the child’s home, and non-relative care outside
the child’s home such center based care, Head Start, and preschool. So any care not given
by the child’s parent would be considered “child care” even if the care occurred in the child’s
home. For example, a live-in nanny would be considered child care and not home care.
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and the mother’s labor market experience evolve endogenously and the mother
faces trade-offs between consumption, leisure, the cognitive development of her
children and the accumulation of labor market experience. For the remainder of
the model section, assume that I have a univariate measures of both home quality
and child care quality. After the model section, I discuss how I measure home
and child care quality in a way consistent with other early childhood research. To
facilitate exposition of the model, I present the model without the specifications
and I put the exact specifications in the appendix.
Preferences
The mother’s contemporaneous utility function is given by:
U(Ct, hL,t, θ
1
t , θ
2
t , h
1
cc,t, h
2
cc,t, L,t, cc,t;Xt)
where her utility at time t depends on consumption, Ct, hours of leisure, hL,t, the
cognitive skills of child i, θit, hours of child care for child i, h
i
cc,t and shocks to the
utility of leisure, L,t, and child care use, cc,t. In addition, the variables Xt enter
the model as marginal utility shifters by allowing some parameters to vary by
marital status, the number of younger children, the number of older children and
the age of the children. Direct preferences over hours of care are used to capture
care use patterns by the children’s ages.
Child Care
Each period the household receives a price-quality offer for child care services
with the child care quality given by qcc,t. I assume the child care quality offers
13
are drawn from:
log(qcc,t) ∼ N(µq,cc, σ2q,cc)
The price for the child care quality draw is given by the hedonic equation:
pcc,t = p(qcc,t, p,t)
where p,t is a shock to the price offer given a quality draw qcc,t. The child can
then attend child care of quality qcc,t for h
i
cc,t hours at price per hour of pcc,t.
Head Start
Families may be eligible for government provided care in the form of Head Start,
which is a federal preschool program for children from poor families. Head Start
is free so I put its price as pHS = 0. Let the distribution of Head Start quality
be given by:
log(qHS,t) ∼ N(µq,HS, σ2q,HS)
An eligible child can then attend Head Start that offers child care of quality
qHS,t.
10 To be eligible for Head Start, children must be between the ages of 3 and
5 and the family income must be below a federal threshold, IHS, that depends on
family size. Because Head Start is rationed I assume that eligible families receive
a probabilistic offer of Head Start. Let H it equal 1 if child i has access to Head
10Head Start is a part-time program so I assume that if families choose Head Start but also
want to have full-time care that they use their first draw of price and child care quality to
provide so-called “wrap around care.”
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Start at time t and zero otherwise:
H it = H(A
i
t, YtMt + wt(1000− hL,t), |Family|, HS)
where Ait is the age of child i at time t.
Home Quality
Home quality is observed in the data and I model home quality at time t, qh,t,
as consisting of a household specific permanent component, ω, and a transitory
component, qh,t:
qh,t = qh(ω, qh,t)
Cognitive Achievement Production Function
Cognitive skills evolve endogenously according to the hours spent in child care,
the quality of the child care arrangement, the quality of the home environment,
the time spent at home and previous skills. The value-added cognitive skill
production function is given by:
θit+1 = ω(θ
i
t)
γ1,c(I it)
γ3,ce
i
c,t Production Function
I it = (2000− hicc,t)qh,t + αhicc,tq˜icc,t Input
where qh,t is the quality of the home environment, h
i
h,t is hours in the home en-
vironment, q˜icc,t is the quality of the child care environment for child i, h
i
cc,t is
hours in the child care environment, ω is a family specific permanent unobserved
component and ic,t is child specific shock to cognitive skills. The input consists
15
of quality hours spent in the home, (2000− hicc,t)qh,t, and quality hours spent in
child care, hicc,tqˆ
i
cc,t, where I assume that the child has 2000 hours in a period.
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The parameter α governs the substitutability of home and child care quality. For
example, if α is less than one then one unit of home quality is more productive
than one unit of child care quality. The value-added production function captures
the cumulative and dynamic nature of cognitive achievement (Cunha and Heck-
man 2007, 2008). Current skills build on past skills through the parameter γ1,c
so that lagged investment affects both current achievement and the productivity
of current inputs.
Wages and Income
For married couples, the household enters the period knowing the father’s edu-
cation, Ef , and experience, Xf,t. The household draws an income shock I,t and
forms current period income. Similarly, the household draws a wage shock, w,t
and uses the mother’s education, Em, and experience, Xm,t, to form the current
wage offer. I assume that the father transfers τ percent of his income to the
mother, which is a parameter to be estimated. The income and wage functions
are:
wt = w(black, Em, Xm,t, ω, w,t)
It = I(black, Ef , Xf,t, ω, I,t)
I allow being black to directly affect the wage offer and I also have added a
household specific permanent component, ω, for the mother’s wage and for the
11I assume children are awake for 80 hours per week X 26 weeks (6 months), which is ap-
proximately 2000 hours.
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father’s income. I assume that the father works full time so that his experience
evolves deterministically. The mother’s experience evolves according to her labor
supply decision. The transition of the stocks of experience are given by:
Xm,t+1 = Xm,t +
1000− hL,t
2000
Xf,t+1 = Xf,t + .5
Fertility and Divorce
In the model, the probability of a new child is given by pib = pib(x
b
t ;φ
b), which
depends on observable characteristics xbt . I do not permit mothers to have more
than two children less than five years of age. The probability of divorce is given
by pitd = pid(x
d
t,i;φ
d), which depends on observable characteristics xdt and is pa-
rameterized by φd. I do not permit women with young children to remarry or to
cohabitate with a non-biological father.12
Shocks and State Space
Before making labor force and child care decisions, the mother makes a child
care quality and price draw, qcc,t and pcc,t, a Head Start quality draw, qHS,t,
and a shock to Head Start availability to form H it , which equal 1 if child i has
access to Head Start at time t and 0 otherwise. The household also draws shocks
to cognitive skills for each child i in the house, ic,t, to home quality, qh,t, to
12This selection criterion reduces the sample by 9%. I also define a “father” as the child’s
biological father and being “married” in the model conflates cohabitation and marriage. Divorce
then refers to the child’s biological father exiting the household. Women who are “divorced” in
the initial state space may have never been married or may have been cohabitating and then
the father left before the child was 6 months old. Finally, there is a small group where the
biological father is not in the house at baseline but later lives in the house. I exclude this group
from the sample and I lose a further 5%. Evidently women with young children are unlikely to
remarry. See Table 4 for a complete list of sample selection criteria.
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the utility of leisure for the mother, L,t, to the utility of using child care, cc,t,
to the woman’s wage offer, w,t, and to income, I,t. Collecting the shocks in
vector ~t = (
1
c,t, 
2
c,t, qh,t, L,t, cc,t, w,t, I,t)
′ , I assume the shocks are distributed
multivariate normal:
~t ∼ N(0,Σ)
I assume that the shock draws are independent over time. Define the state space
at time t:
Ωt = {Xf,t, Ef , Xm,t, Em, black, hL,t−1, h1cc,t−1, h2cc,t−1, A1t , A2t , Ot, qcc,t, pcc,t, qh,t, ~t}
Let the nonstochastic part of the state space be Ω¯t.
Choices
The household then makes decisions about the mother’s hours of leisure and the
child care hours for each child younger than age 5. Let hL,t be a discrete variable
that equals 0 if the wife stays at home in period t, 500 if she works part time
and 1000 if she works full time.13 Hours of child care for child i, hicc,t, can also
equal either 0, 500 or 1000. For a family with Head Start in their choice set for
child i, let DiHS equal 1 if child i attends Head Start and 0 otherwise. In addition
to the three labor supply choices, a household with two children can have up to
five child care choices for each child (home, part-time child care, full-time child
care, part-time Head Start or full-time Head Start) for a total of up to 75 choices.
13Because each period corresponds to 6 months, I assume that mothers working full-time
work 40 hours per week times 24 weeks = 960 hours. I round to 1000 hours for full-time work
and set 500 hours as part-time work.
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Household with less children and who are not Head Start eligible have a smaller
choice set.
Mother’s Problem
Writing the problem recursively, the mother solves:
Vt(Ωt) = max
h1cc,t,D
1
HS,t,h
2
cc,t,D
2
HS,t,hL,t
{U(Ct + Cmin(1−Mt), θ1c,t, θ2c,t, hL,t, h1cc,t, h2cc,t, L,t, cc,t)
+ βEVt+1(Ω¯t+1)}
subject to:
τItMt + wt(1000− hL,t) = Ct +
2∑
i=1
pcc,th
i
cc,t(1−H itDiHS,t)
+ pcc,th
i
cc,t1{hicc,t = 1000}H itDiHS,t
Ct ≥ 0
hicc,t + h
i
h,t = 2000
hL,t + hw,t = 1000
Terminal Value
For the terminal value function, the woman needs to keep track of the cognitive
skills for all of her children. At age 45, the woman then attaches a utility value
to the total stock of age five cognitive skills of all her children. Define θTc,t as the
total cognitive skills for all of the children in the house at time t. The stock of
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cognitive skills increases when children turn 5 according to:
θTc,t = θ
T
c,t−1 + θ
1
c,t1{A1t > 5}+ θ1c,t1{A2t > 5}
The horizon is finite. At period T, assumed to be 45 years of age, the woman
faces a terminal value function that depends on the state space. I assume:
VT+1 = Acθ
T
c,t + AeXf,T+1
where Ac and Ae are parameters to be estimated.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Finally, the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is f(ω) where I assume
that f(·) follows a discrete distribution with K support points. The support
points are sometimes called “types.” This treatment of unobserved heterogeneity
follows Heckman and Singer (1984). Recall that there is unobserved heterogeneity
over income, wages, home quality and cognitive skills. Because the unobserved
heterogeneity also determines the initial conditions through a process not modeled
here, I allow the probability of being a particular type to be a function of the
initial conditions. In the estimation, I assume that there are K = 2 types.
Solution Method
The model is solved backward from the last period. Given the state space, I draw
from the distribution of shocks and calculate the optimal choice. I repeat this
process and take the average over the optimal values. This simulated integra-
tion gives the expected maximum value at that particular state space point. I
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then pick a different state space point and repeat the simulated integration. The
resulting function is known in the literature as the EMAX function. Instead of
calculating the EMAX at every point in the state space, I use an approximation
method developed by Keane and Wolpin (2004). First, I randomly select a subset
of the state space points and calculate the EMAX at each point in the randomly
drawn subset. Second, I use a polynomial approximation to the EMAX func-
tion and use the predicted value to “fill-in” any state space point where I did
not calculate the EMAX. For the evolution of marriage and number of children,
I use exact integration because I have assumed a closed form for the probabilities.
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Chapter 4
Measuring Child Care and Home Quality
The quality of an environment, either in the home or in a child care setting, is
intended to capture the amount of stimulation that children receive in that en-
vironment.14 Stimulation can come in the form of developmentally appropriate
materials, whether the caregiver encourages the child and the kinds of activities
that the classroom or child does during their time in child care, such as reading
books or singing songs.15 In the child care literature, researchers make a distinc-
tion between structural and process measures of quality.16 Structural measures
include the student-caregiver ratio and the qualifications of the caregiver. Im-
proved structural measures are thought to increase the likely of high quality care
but do not guarantee improved care quality. On the other hand, process measures
capture what actually occurs in the child care environment and are the actual
“quality” of the child care environment.
One commonly used measure of child care quality is the Early Childhood
Environment Rating Scale (ECERS). The ECERS asks questions about the rou-
tines that occur in the classroom, the use of language by the caregiver toward
the child, whether there is time for motor activities, whether the child engages in
14The word quality is typically used in reference to child care settings. The quality of home
environment might be called the HOME score (in refernence to a particular scale) or home
inputs. I use quality to define the amount of measured stimulation in any environment whether
home or child care. The point of my paper is that the foregone alternative of making a child
care choice is often the quality of the home environment.
15See Love et al. (2006), Caldwell and Bradley (1984) for discussions and definitions.
16See Vandell and Wolfe (2000).
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creative activities such as music or art, observer impressions of the “tone of inter-
action” and many others. Other scales, such as the Global Rating Scale, attempt
to measure whether the relationship between the care provider and the child is
“positive” by assessing how the caregiver speaks to the child, whether they enjoy
the child, etc.17 Although the scales have some overlap, there does not seem to
be complete uniformity in questions that related to quality. In general, measures
of child care “quality” can then be any variable that measures materials in the
care environment and whether the interactions between child and caregivers are
“stimulating.”
Analogous to issue of measuring child care quality is the issue of measur-
ing home quality. A commonly used measure is the Home Observation for the
Measurement of the Environment (HOME). The HOME scale is based on direct
observation and interviewer questions of the parent. The questions vary by the
age of the child. Some subscales that span multiple ages are questions related to
the learning environment, parental responsivity, and learning materials.18 The
HOME scale includes questions about whether the parent spontaneously spoke
to the child, verbal responses to the child, whether the parent provided toys to
the child and whether the interviewer felt the play environment was safe. The
goal is capture whether the child lives in a stimulating environment both from
the mother and from items that the family might buy.19 Bradley and Caldwell
(1984) argue that the HOME scale is consistent with “Piagetian notions about
17Lamb (1998) has a discussion of child care quality with examples of difference scales that
measure quality and the different areas that the scales measure.
18See the Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment (HOME) Inventory.
19Bernal and Keane (2008) make a distinction between time and goods inputs, which I do
not follow. Todd and Wolpin (2007) also discuss how the HOME scale conflates time and goods
inputs and also combines items that could logically be considered inputs with items that instead
seem to be proxies for inputs. Instead my approach is closer to Cunha and Heckman (2008),
who model the inputs into the production function as a latent variable.
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the development of sensorimotor and preoperational thinking.”
An advantage of using the ECERS and HOME scales is that these scales have
both been extensively used and validated in the literature. A disadvantage is the
weighting of the scale items is essentially arbitrary. Cunha and Heckman (2008)
state “[t]he constructed indices often have an ad hoc quality about them and may
be poor proxies for the true combination of inputs that enter the technology.”
In my data, I have measures from the HOME scale and from the ECERS scale.
However, a limitation is the data contain only a subset of questions from the
HOME scale and the ECERS was collected only for a small subset of children.
The data also contain additional questions that could be considered inputs and I
risk losing information by focusing only on the HOME and ECERS scale. Table
2 have a list of information in the data that I use to form the measure of the
home environment and table 3 has a comparable list of questions that I use the
form the child care quality measure. The home quality measures are a mix of
direct observation and self-reports by the parents. The child care quality mea-
sures are reported by the child care providers. Similar to the existing scales, I
choose to combine all of the information on inputs into a single variable for the
home environment and a single variable for the child care environment. Specif-
ically, for the measurements of home and child care quality and for each round,
I use principle components analysis (PCA) to collapse the data into an index
and I treat the predicted component as data, where the component is chosen to
explain the maximize amount of variance in the measures of home and child care
quality. Although using PCA does not address the criticism that the weights
are arbitrary, PCA captures a component that explains the maximum amount
of variance in the data and allows me to expand my sample and to incorporate
all input information in the data. Moreover, given that questions vary across
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existing scales, it seems that there is no consensus on which measures should be
used to capture the quality of children’s experiences.20
Chapter 5
Data
I estimate the model using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study
- Birth Cohort (ECLS-B). The ECLS-B is a nationally representative panel of
14,000 children born in 2001. Researchers followed the children from birth until
kindergarten entry and collected detailed information about their family back-
ground, home environment, maternal work decisions, maternal wages, family in-
come, child care usage and cognitive achievement outcomes. Child care providers
were given questionnaires that asked detailed information about the care environ-
ment, care activities, qualifications and questions designed to elicit information
about their attitudes towards child care. Families were also asked questions about
the kinds of activities the child engaged in and the materials and toys the child
had access to. Selected summary statistics for the data used in the analysis is
given in table 1. The measures used in the principal-components analysis for the
child care and home environment quality are given in tables 2 and 3.
The ECLS-B consists of five rounds of data collection. The researchers visited
the children when they were approximately 9 months, 2 years, 4 years and 5 years
with a follow-up round for delayed kindergarten entrants. I use the first four
20See Layzer and Goodson (2006) for a discussion about the difficulties in defining and
measuring child care quality and relating child care quality to child outcomes.
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rounds.21 Two issues complicate taking the model to the data. First, the spacing
between rounds is irregular. Second, there is a large amount of variability in
assessment age at each round. For example, in the 9 month round, the children
actually ranged in age from 6 months to 18 months. Because of these features
of the data set, I instead organize the data into 6 month bins with bins at 6 -
12 months, 12 - 18 months, 18 - 24 months, etc. For each round I will see some
children in each age bin and I will see each child four times (ignoring attrition).
I treat the observations between rounds when I do not see the child as missing
data. Because the amount of missing data is large, I do not estimate the model
by maximum likelihood. Instead I use the method of simulated moments where I
simulate different paths and form statistics for the children when I observe them.
The estimation procedure is described in more detail below.
For the cognitive achievement measures, the ECLS-B contains the Bayley
Short Form- Research Edition (BSF-R) at the 9 month and 2 year waves. The
BSF-R uses a subset of the Bayley Scales for Infant Development, 2nd Edition
(BSID-II), which is a assessment that places infants in various situations and
scores their responses. The BSF-R can be given to children from 2 to 30 months.
The assessment contains both a mental and a motor score. I use the mental score
for my analysis. Examples situations from the BSF-R include ringing bells and
checking whether the child turns their head in response and whether the child
vocalizes at least once during the interview. Each situation contains a series of
activities that are age and developmentally appropriate. The assessor checks the
child’s responses in order to locate their basal and ceiling levels. For the ECLS-
B, the interviewers gave children a core assessment and moved downward to the
21The fifth round of data collection is for the subset of children who are delayed kindergarten
entrants.
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basal set for children for whom the core set was too difficult. The ceiling set was
used for children who got the core set perfectly. Instead of reporting the BSF-R
score, researchers used Item Response Theory (IRT) to predict a scale score on
the BSID-II, which is what is reported in the data file. The data also contain a
norm referenced T-score.
For cognitive achievement at older ages, the ECLS-B administered math and
early reading tests. The math and reading tests were adaptive tests derived from
well-known early childhood assessments. To encourage cross-study comparisons,
the ECLS-B used questions previously developed for the ECLS-K, the Head Start
Impact Study and the Family and Child Experiences Study. In addition, ques-
tions were added from the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT, various
forms), the Test of Early Mathematics Ability-3 (TEMA-3), the Preschool Com-
prehensive Test of Phonological and Print Processing (Pre-CTOPPP) and the
PreLAS 2000.22 Again, the ECLS-B contain scale scores and T-scores for both
the math and early reading tests. I use the scale scores. To combine information,
I simply average the math and early reading scores. Finally, because test scores
do not have a metric, I standardize the scale scores by age.
22For additional information on the cogntive assessments see “The ECLS-B Direct Assessment
Choosing the Appropriate Score for Analysis.”
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Chapter 6
Estimation
The model has 73 parameters that I estimate using the method of simulated
moments. The basic idea is to match statistics from simulated data generated
from the model to corresponding statistics in the data. The procedure works as
follows. Given a set of parameters, I solve the model by iterating backward from
the terminal value. I then use each woman’s initial conditions to draw her type
from the discrete distribution of types. Given the model solution, her type and
the initial conditions, I then simulate a path of endogenous variables for each
woman in the data set. I repeat this procedure five times to create five “clones”
of each person in the data set. I calculate statistics from the simulated data using
only the rounds where I actually observe the families. The estimation procedure
iterates between the model solution and objective function, which is a weighted
distance between statistics computed from the data and corresponding statistics
computed from the simulated data. I weight the moment difference by the inverse
of the variance of each data moment.
There are two complications in the estimation. The first estimation issue is
that the model has multiple children per family but I only observe one child
per family in the ECLS-B . It is important to consider multiple children in the
estimation because restricting the sample to families with one realized child could
bias the estimation if families perceive that they will have more children even if
they actually do not end up having more children. I am able to identify the
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model with multiple children through assumptions about the mother’s utility
over cognitive skills and through the estimation procedure. I assume that the
children’s skills enter linearly and additively separably in the utility function so
that mothers care about efficiency when making decisions.23 Then because I use
unconditional simulations from the initial conditions, I never have to calculate
conditional choice probabilities for unobserved state space elements such as the
cognitive skills of other children in the family. Although my assumptions about
the mother’s utility function is not testable because I never observe the cognitive
skills of other children in family, the model does have implications for how sibling’s
cognitive achievement scores are correlated.24 In the estimation results section I
present simulated evidence from the model about the intra-sibling correlation in
cognitive skills and birth order effects on cognitive achievement, which I compare
to other studies to give an idea about the model’s predictions. I also plan to
explore the robustness of my conclusions in future work by using a CES aggregator
of the children’s cognitive skills for different assumptions about the value of the
complementary parameter.
The second estimation issue is that the ECLS-B is not a random sample of
children but a sample of children born in 2001. However, I assume that the model
begins when the mother first has a child, which could be in or before 2001. In
order for the mother to be selected in the ECLS-B, she must have a sequence of
shocks such that she has a birth in 2001. I mimic the ECLS-B sample selection
procedure by only keeping sequences of shocks with a birth in 2001.
23Even when multiple children are observed estimates of the efficiency vs. equity trade-offs
have produced different results. See the discussion and papers cited in Behrman (1997).
24The ECLS-B does have information on twins, which I do not use in the estimation, but
this could be another potential avenue to check the modeling assumptions.
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Objective Function
Suppose θ is the vector of parameters to estimate. Let Ki be an M x 1 vector
function of the data for family i. The method of simulated moments estimator is
given by:
θˆmsm = argmin
θ
ψ(θ)
with:
ψ(θ) =
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
[Ki − 1
S
S∑
s=1
ki(u
s
i ; θ, ω
s
i |usi ∈ ECLSB)]]W−1
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
[Ki − 1
S
S∑
s=1
ki(u
s
i ; θ, ω
s
i |usi ∈ ECLSB)]]
Ki : M x 1 vector function of the data for family i
ki(u
s
i ; θ, ω
s
i ) : M x 1 vector function of the simulated data for
family i given draw usi and permanent component ω
s
i
W−1 : weighting matrix
The simulated integration over the shocks usi also includes integrating out the
unobserved heterogeneity ωsi , which I draw from the discrete distribution given
family i’s initial conditions. The conditioning statement usi ∈ ECLSB captures
that the sequence of shocks must be such that the mother has a birth in 2001 in
order to have been selected into the ECLS-B. For the weighting matrix W, I use
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the inverse of the diagonal variance matrix of the data moments.
Standard Errors
To simplify notation let µ(θ) = 1
S
∑S
s=1 ki(u
s
i ; θ, ω
s
i |usi ∈ ECLSB) be the vector of
simulated moments given the parameter vector θ. Taking the derivative of the
objective function with respect to θ yields the following first order conditions:
∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣′
θˆN
W−1[
1
N
N∑
i=1
[Ki − µ(θN)] = 0
A Taylor expansion around µ(θ0) gives:
µ(θN) = µ(θ0) +
∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ∗
(θN − θ0)
for some θ∗ between θ0 and θN . Plugging the Taylor expansion into the first order
condition, premultiplying and rearranging gives:
√
N(θN − θ0) =
(
∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣′
θˆN
W−1
∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ∗
)−1(
∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣′
θˆN
W−1
[
1√
N
N∑
i=1
[Ki − µ(θ0)
])
Applying a Central Limit Theorem gives the following variance-covariance
matrix for the limiting distribution:
(
∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣′
θˆN
W−1
∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ∗
)−1(
∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣′
θˆN
W−1V [K − µ(θ0)]W−1 ∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θˆN
)(
∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣′
θˆN
W−1
∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ∗
)−1
I then approximate ∂µ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θˆN
using the matrix of numerical partial derivatives cal-
culated at the optimal parameter value and V [K−µ(θ0)] is approximated by the
variance-covariance of the moments at the optimal parameter value.
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Moments
I use 622 moments in the estimation. The moments are as follows (number of
moments in parentheses):
• Average child cognitive skills
1. by mother’s marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by number younger siblings (2)
8. by lagged cognitive achievement quartile (4)
9. by lagged hours and quartiles of home and child care quality ()
10. by number older siblings (3)
11. by age of focal child (7)
12. by age of mother (12)
13. by lagged home inputs, child care inputs and hours of care (36)
14. lagged cognitive achievement (4)
15. variance by lagged cognitive achievement (4)
16. standard deviation (1)
• Percent in full-time child care
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1. by parents’ marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by number younger siblings (2)
8. by number older siblings (3)
9. by age of focal child (7)
10. by age of mother (12)
11. standard deviation (1)
• Percent in part-time child care
1. by parents’ marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by number younger siblings (2)
8. by number older siblings (3)
9. by age of focal child (7)
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10. by age of mother (12)
11. standard deviation (1)
• Average child care quality
1. by parents’ marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by number younger kids (2)
8. by number older kids (3)
9. by age of focal child (5)
10. by age of mother (11)
11. standard deviation (1)
12. autocorrelation between rounds (1)
• Average child care price
1. by marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
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6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by number younger kids (2)
8. by number older kids (3)
9. by age of focal child (7)
10. by age of mother (12)
11. standard deviation (1)
12. autocorrelation between rounds (1)
• Percent in Head Start
1. by parents’ marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (5)
6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by number younger kids (2)
8. by number older kids (3)
9. average Head Start child care quality (1)
10. standard deviation Head Start child care quality (1)
• Average home quality
1. by marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
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3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by number younger kids (2)
8. by number older kids (3)
9. by age of focal child (7)
10. standard deviation (1)
11. autocorrelation between rounds (1)
• Percent in full-time labor force participation
1. by parents’ marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by number younger siblings (2)
8. by number older siblings (3)
9. by age of focal child (7)
10. by age of mother (12)
11. standard deviation (1)
36
• Percent in part-time labor force participation
1. by parents’ marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by number younger siblings (2)
8. by number older siblings (3)
9. by age of focal child (7)
10. by age of mother (12)
11. standard deviation (1)
• Joint distribution of labor supply and child care hours (8)
• Child care transition probabilities between rounds (8)
• Labor supply transition probabilities between rounds (8)
• Average mother’s wage:
1. by marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
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6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by number younger kids (2)
8. by number older kids (3)
9. by age of focal child (7)
10. by age of mother (12)
11. standard deviation (1)
12. autocorrelation between rounds (1)
• Average husband’s income:
1. by race (2)
2. by mother’s education (4)
3. by father’s education (4)
4. by father’s experience (6)
5. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
6. by number younger kids (2)
7. by number older kids (3)
8. by age of focal child (8)
9. standard deviation (1)
10. autocorrelation between rounds (1)
• Percent married:
1. by race (2)
2. by mother’s education (4)
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3. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
4. by number younger kids (2)
5. by number older kids (3)
6. by age of focal child (7)
7. by age of mother (12)
8. standard deviation (1)
• Number of children less than 5:
1. by marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by age of mother (12)
8. standard deviation (1)
• Number of children older than 5:
1. by marital status (2)
2. by race (2)
3. by mother’s education (4)
4. by father’s education (4)
5. by father’s experience (6)
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6. by mother’s age at first birth (4)
7. by age of mother (10)
8. standard deviation (1)
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Chapter 7
Child Care Subsidies
Child care subsidies are an important policy tool to encourage the labor force
participation of poor women by defraying the costs associated with child care
(Adams and Rohacek 2002). Blau (2003) provides an extended discussion of the
issues related to the design of different child subsidy programs. In particular, Blau
(page 445) emphasizes “the trade-off faced by policymakers between the goals of
improving child well-being and increasing economic self-sufficiency.” Subsidies
typically have few restrictions on the type of care for which they can be used
and recent research suggests these subsidies may have harmful effects on child
outcomes (Herbst and Tekin 2010; Hawkinson, Griffen, Dong and Maynard 2010).
An open question is to understand the mechanisms through which child care
subsidies affect children’s cognitive achievement and to relate the design of child
care subsidy policy parameters to both labor supply and cognitive achievement
outcomes.
Institutional Details
Federal funding for child care subsidies is provided by the Child Care Develop-
ment Fund (CCDF).25 In 2006, the total federal funding of the CCDF was almost
5 billion dollars. Part of the federal funding is given automatically. The other
25All the information in this section is distilled from the House Ways and Means Committee’s
2008 Green Book section on child care and the Child Care Bureau’s “State Child Care Subsidies:
Trends in Rate Ceilings and Family Fees (May 2005)” publication.
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part of federal funding is contingent on states matching federal funds with states
monies. In addition, states are allowed to transfer up to 30% of the money from
their TANF block grant to the CCDF. For example, in 2006, states contributed
an additional 4 billion dollars to the CCDF.
The CCDF targets poor working parents to assist with the expenses related to
child care. To be eligible, the federal government stipulates that families be below
85% of their state’s median income level. Beyond this requirement, states have
flexibility in designing their programs. The CCDF funding is not an entitlement
and states are required to give preference for more economically disadvantaged
families. Children must be less than 13 years old and parents must both (if
married) be working or in school. In 2007, there were 992,400 families and 1.7
million children served by the CCDF per month. Herbst (2008) summarizes that
“these studies suggest that ... the states serve between 15% and 30% of the
[CCDF] eligible population.”
CCDF subsidizes child care by providing recipients with a voucher or certifi-
cate that can be used to purchase child care services.26 The maximum price per
hour that the state will reimburse for child care expenses is referred to as the
“rate ceiling.” States are required to conduct market surveys of child care costs
every two years and per federal recommendation, many states set the rate ceiling
at the 75th percentile of the distribution of market prices. To share costs, parents
must pay a co-pay that is either a percentage of their income or, in a few states, a
percentage of the rate ceiling. The co-pay varies by family size and across states
and, in some states, the copay can be waived for the very poor.
26Some states give cash reimbursement for child care expenses and some states have child
care providers that contract directly with the state to provide child care to CCDF recipients.
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Modeling Child Care Subsidies
The child care subsidy system fits neatly into the model through the budget
constraint. First, I define some terms:
rate ceiling = rc
copay = ψ(ItMt + wt(1000− hL,t))
income cutoff = I¯
s
where ψ is the percentage of income that is a copay. Let St be 1 if family is
subsidy eligible, 0 otherwise:
St = 1{hL,t < 1000}1{ItMt + wt(1000− hL,t) < I¯s}
where 1{hL,t < 1000} captures that women must work and 1{ItMt + wt(1000 −
hL,t) < I¯
s} indicates that family income must be below 85% of the state median
income. To fit the child care subsidy program into the budget constraint, recall
the price of child care is pcc. If the price is less than the rate ceiling, the family
pays only the copay. If the price is greater than the rate ceiling, then the family
pays the copay plus the difference between the rate ceiling and the price for every
hour of child care.27 For exposition I ignore Head Start and multiple children.
27There is a second type of subsidy scheme where the state will not pay for child care that
costs more than the rate ceiling. This is a trivial extension of the current analysis but I will
add it for future work.
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Under a subsidy, the mother would have the following budget constraint:
Ct + pcc,thcc,t(1− St)+
[0hcc,t 1(pcc,t ≤ rc) + 1(pcc,t > rc)[pcc,t − rc]hcc,t + ψ(ItMt + wt(1000− hL,t))]St
= τItMt + wt(1000− hL,t)
The mother will choose to not use the subsidy if the total cost of child care under
the subsidy exceeds the cost without the subsidy. This can occur if the price is
so low that the copay is greater than the reduction in the price per hour. To
check the participation constraint, I simply compare costs and set the subsidy
eligibility variable equal to zero in the case that the mother would not use the
subsidy:
0hcc,t 1(pcc,t ≤ rc) + 1(pcc,t > rc)[pcc,t − rc]hcc,t + ψ(ItMt + wt(1000− hL,t))
≤ pcc,thcc,t
An important caveat to modeling the child care subsidy program that limits my
analysis is that I cannot explicitly incorporate state level variation in the sub-
sidy policy parameters because of computational considerations. For example,
families living in different states (and counties) face different rate ceilings, dif-
ferent income eligibility cutoffs and different copays. I sidestep these issues by
dropping subsidy recipients from the estimation and by calibrating the policy
parameters to national averages. Using information from the National Center for
Child Poverty (NCCP), I set the biannual income cutoff to $15,500, the copay to
9% of family income and $3.89 for the rate ceiling.28 In the counterfactual simu-
28See the 50-State Policy Wizard for CCDF subsidies at the NCCP website.
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lations, I use the calibrated program parameters as a baseline and I explore how
changing features of the subsidy programs affects both labor force participation
and the cognitive skills of children through decisions about child care use and
quality decisions.
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Chapter 8
Estimation Results
Parameters Estimates
The parameter estimates and associated standard errors are displayed in Table
C.1 in Appendix C. The parameters of the cognitive achievement production
function play an important role in tracing out the impact of different policy
counterfactuals on the cognitive skills of children. The parameters suggest that
cognitive skills are persistent (γ1,c = 0.79), a child’s environment is an important
determinant of skills (γ3,c = 0.43) and that home environments are on aver-
age more productive than child care environments in producing cognitive skills
(α = 0.59). These parameter estimates are important for the counterfactuals
because the persistence in the production of cognitive skills causes inputs in one
period to affect future cognitive achievement through the value-added achieve-
ment production function.
Besides these parameters, the type distribution parameter on being black is
insignificant although being black is significant determinant of wage and income
offers. This is an important result because it suggests that observed differences by
race in marriage rates, education levels, wage and income offers and their effects
on choices can explain the black-white achievement gap.29 Other parameters have
intuitive and obvious signs and magnitudes.
29This is consistent with Fryer and Levitt (2004) who document that the black-white achieve-
ment gap at kindergarten entry in the ECLS-K shrinks dramatically with a few controls.
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Some of the features of the estimates are difficult to understand without simu-
lating the model. In Table C.2, I compute wage elasticities, intra-sibling correla-
tion in cognitive skills and birth order effects on cognitive skills. Computing the
elasticities on data simulated from the model at the final parameter estimates,
the intensive labor supply elasticity is 0.89 and the extensive labor supply elastic-
ity is 0.88, which are consistent with previously high estimated wage elasticities
for women.30 Comparing cognitive skills among siblings, I find 0.48 for the intra-
sibling correlation in cogntive achievement test scores, which is very close to the
0.5 intra-sibling correlation for IQ scores among siblings reported in Scarr (1994).
I find evidence for both spurious and genuine birth order effects in the sim-
ulated data. In Table C.2, without conditioning on the number of children, the
results show that later born children have lower cognitive achievement test scores
on average, which is consistent with reported findings on birth order. However,
conditioning on the number of children, the effect of birth order on cognitive
achievement diminishes, which is consistent with the theory that mothers with
larger families have lower observed or unobserved determinants of their children’s
cognitive achievement.31 However, even conditioning on number of children, the
later born children still have lower scores on average. These birth order effects
could result from the budget constraint if mothers choose lower and more afford-
able child care quality. Or, when the number of children increases, low quality
home environment mothers could select to be stay at home and not use child
care, which would result in a higher dose of low quality home care for later born
children.
30Heckman and McCurdy (1980), Keane and Wolpin (2006).
31Rodgers et al. (2000) discuss how most birth order studies use cross-sectional data and
that the findings disappear with controls for family size.
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Model Fit
The model fit is displayed in Tables C.3 - C.12 in Appendix C. The model captures
well all the main features of the data (Table C.3). There are gaps in cognitive
achievement test scores by race, mother’s marital status and maternal education
(Table C.4). Home quality is higher on average for white children with married
parents and mothers with higher education (Table C.9). Child care quality also
displays the patterns observed in the data with blacks and children of single
parents having, on average, better child care experiences than white children
and children with married parents (Table C.6). This reflects the role of Head
Start and the higher likelihood of more disadvantaged children being eligible for
Head Start. The lower home quality of these groups also increases the marginal
productivity of child care quality, which provides an additional incentive for them
to accept higher quality child care draws. On the other hand, the lower wages
draws of single and black mothers mitigates their ability to pay for child care
quality.
The model also captures the U-shape for child care quality as maternal educa-
tion increases. To the extent that maternal education proxies for socioeconomic
status, the child care quality experiences for middle-income children are often the
worst because their families are not poor enough to quality for subsidized care
but higher quality care is more expensive. Another interesting feature is that
quality does not increase dramatically for higher education mothers, which is
strange given the apparent productivity of higher quality care.32 Such a pattern
could reflect poor consumer knowledge of the quality of child care experiences
32Hagy and Blau (1998) document a similar pattern for the demand for structural measures
of quality. Their result is perhaps not as surprising given the lack of productivity of structural
measures of quality (Blau 1999) and the weak relation between structural measures and process
measures (Blau 1997).
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(Walker, 1991) or perhaps the mothers have limited knowledge of the cognitive
achievement production function.33 The model also picks up the patterns of child
care use with small differences in black/white and married/single usage patterns.
White mothers have higher wage offers (as a result of higher education and ex-
perience), which increases their likelihood to work, but they also are more likely
to be married, which increases their demand for leisure through non-labor (hus-
band’s) income effects. The higher home quality of married/white mothers gives
an additional incentive to stay home because of higher productivity of their in-
puts in creating cognitive skills. The model also captures different labor force
patterns by maternal characteristics (Table C.10), the distribution of decision
(Table C.11) and the transition of work and child care decisions (Table C.11).
In Figure F.4, F.5 and F.6, I document several patterns that the model cap-
tures even though these moments were not used explicitly in the estimation. It
is noteworthy that the model can capture these patterns because it suggests that
the within sample fit for some important moments not used in the estimation is
reasonable. First, Figures F.4 and F.5 show the emergence of the test score gap
by maternal education and by race. The model captures the small initial gaps
in test scores by race and maternal education that open up early and persist as
the children age.34 Second, Figure F.6 plots the average child care quality by
race and child’s age. Although the data are noisy, the interesting feature of this
pattern is that the higher average child care quality for black children occurs only
after around age 3. The model captures through the availability of Head Start
when the children turn age 3. Black children are disproportionately eligible for
33Bernal (2008) discusses the assumption that the mothers know the functional form for the
production of cognitive achievement.
34Fryer and Levitt (2006) also document the small test score gap at the 9 month round in
the ECLS-B.
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Head Start because of lower average family income so that beginning at age 3
their mothers receive higher average child care quality offers, which pushes up the
average child care quality for blacks and the model generates a similar pattern
to that observed in the data.
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Chapter 9
Counterfactuals
The main goal of the paper is to evaluate the role of two kinds of child care
policies, Head Start and child care subsidies, and their effects on (a) children’s
cognitive achievement and (b) maternal labor force participation. For cognitive
skills, I discuss how different policies affect the amount of child care used and
the quality of child care chosen. I also document the per capita and total cost
associated with different interventions and the effect of policies on closing gaps
in cognitive achievement by race.
Head Start
The results from the Head Start counterfactuals are displayed in Tables D.1
to D.3 in Appendix D. As a model validation exercise, I first use the model
to evaluate Head Start using the same design as the Head Start Impact Study
(HSIS), a randomized controlled trial of Head Start. The HSIS consisted of two
interventions; a group of 4 year olds who were randomized to receive Head Start
or not (HSIS 4 year olds) and a group of 3 year olds who were randomized into
a treatment group and a delayed treatment control group that could apply again
for Head Start at age 4 (HSIS 3 year olds). In Table D.1, I report the effect
sizes for two arms of the HSIS computed in my estimated model and from the
report of the HSIS.35 I report two kinds of estimates of the program’s effect. The
35The effect sizes from the HSIS were computed as follows: for the reading domain outcomes, I
averaged across the effect sizes for all of the reading outcomes. For the math domain, I averaged
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first, the Intent to Treat estimate, is the average change in the outcome for all
eligibles. The second estimate is the Treatment on the Treated, which is the
average change in the outcome only for children that use the program.
The intent to treat estimate for the HSIS 4 year olds design is 0.06 in my
model and 0.12 in the HSIS study. For the same design, the Treatment on the
Treated estimate is 0.12 in my simulations and 0.17 in the HSIS. Using the HSIS
3 year olds design, I find an effect size of 0.07 in my simulations and the HSIS
reports 0.05 for the Intent to Treat estimate. The Treatment on the Treated
estimate is 0.13 versus 0.06 in the HSIS. Although the HSIS was conducted on a
different cohort of children, with a sample of oversubscribed Head Start centers
and could not prevent treatment crossovers to other Head Start centers, the effect
sizes simulated in my model and reported in HSIS are of a similar magnitude,
which provides evidence of the validity of my model.36
I next use the model to consider three types policies: removing Head Start
completely (an arm that the HSIS did not evaluate), replacing Head Start with
cash transfers to eligible families and expanding Head Start services to current
non-eligibles. Table D.2 displays the results from these counterfactual experi-
ments. I report Intent to Treat estimates for the effect of the different interven-
tions on Head Start eligibles, where Head Start eligibility can change depending
on the income cutoff. The first row illustrates that removing Head Start lowers
across the effect sizes for all of the math outcomes. I then averaged the separate math and
reading effect sizes, which most closely approximates my treatment of the data in the ECLS-B.
The Treatment on the Treated impacts were derived from the Intent to Treat impacts in the
HSIS using the Bloom adjustment.
36Todd and Wolpin (2006) use experimental data to validate a structurally estimated eco-
nomic model. They estimate their model using data from from an experimental evaluation
of PROGRESA, a conditional cash transfer program in Mexico. They limit their estimation
sample to data in the control group and use the estimated model to predict the experimental
impacts of PROGRESA. The difference in my case is that I estimate the model using a com-
pletely different data set and only mimic the design of the experiment for the model validation.
However, the spirit of the exercise is the same.
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cognitive achievement scores by -0.15 standard deviations at kindergarten entry.
Removing Head Start has only a moderate impact on changing maternal labor
force participation. This is not surprising given that Head Start imposes no work
requirement as a condition of participation. The second row considers the effect
of not only removing Head Start but giving Head Start eligible families a cash
transfer of the per student spending on Head Start per six months ($3,610). The
idea is to test whether in kind transfers are a better method of achieving the aims
of Head Start through parents making better decisions when provided the money
directly. The results indicate that, compared to providing Head Start, providing
transfers lowers cognitive achievement scores (-0.13 SD). The cash transfer also
has a large negative effect on maternal labor supply (-10 percentage points) so to
the extent that maternal labor supply is a policy objective these unconditional
transfers do not encourage labor supply.
Table D.2 rows 3 to 6 gradually expand Head Start by increasing the Head
Start income eligibility cutoff. The Intent to Treat estimates increases mono-
tonically in the income cutoff for a maximum of 0.21 SD impact on cognitive
achievement at kindergarten entry. This finding suggests that even for higher
income children there substantial gains to be had in their cognitive achievement
scores at kindergarten entry.37 One reason for this is that children from higher
income families tend to spend more time in child care and the child care quality
data presented in the data section show that child care quality experiences of
these children are not particularly high. Providing a relatively higher quality
Head Start option increases the cognitive skills of non-eligibles because of their
extensive use of low quality child care.
Finally, in Table D.3, I consider the effect of the previously described coun-
37This result is consistent with Gormley et al., 2005.
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terfactuals on closing the black-white (BW) achievement gap. The first column
shows that without Head Start the BW achievement gap would be 9% larger at
kindergarten entry. Head Start has a fairly substantial effect of narrowing the
BW achievement gap. This finding reflects both the relative productivity of Head
Start compared to other forms of child care and the differential access to Head
Start by black children, because of family income eligibility cutoffs. The cash
transfer in place of Head Start increases the black-white achievement gap; the
gap would be 3.96% higher with cash transfers in place of Head Start. Increasing
the eligibility cutoff at first lowers the gap but gradually increases the gap as
more and more higher income children benefit from Head Start services. With
universal Head Start, the BW achievement gap would actually be 12.11% larger.
This result shows that closing the BW achievement gap can be a paradoxical goal;
there are policies that benefit all children yet would increase differences between
blacks and whites at kindergarten entry.
Child Care Subsidies
The results from the child care subsidies counterfactuals are presented in Tables
D.4 to D.6 in Appendix D. As discussed previously, I estimate the model without
the child care subsidy program and then introduce the program into the model
with the policy parameters calibrated to national averages. In Table D.4, I report
the effect on cognitive achievement of the calibrated subsidy program; I find that
6 months of exposure increases cognitive achievement scores by 0.034 standard
deviations. The child care subsidies also have a large impact on labor force
participation; increasing the labor supply by 18 percentage points.38 Another
38This is consistent with the effect of child care costs on maternal employment estimated in
Blau and Robins (1988), Connelly (1992) and Ribar (1992).
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interesting feature of the simulations is that the subsidy take-up, defined as the
percentage of eligible families that use the subsidy, is 40.8 percent, which implies
that a substantial fraction of the low take-up of subsidies can be explained by
the labor supply decisions of mothers and not using the subsidies for low price
child care providers.
I next vary each subsidy policy parameter holding the other two policy pa-
rameters constant at their calibrated values. The idea is to describe how changing
the policy parameter affects the cognitive skills of children, the labor supply of
mothers, the program coverage and the cost per child. In the first block in Table
D.4, I gradually increase the copay from 0 percent to 30 percent. The Intent
to Treat estimated effect on cognitive skills gradually falls. Although child care
quality could increase as the copay increases (by discouraging subsidy recipients
from accepting low price child care offers), the effect on cognitive skills seems to
diminish. This result is partly driven by lower take-up of the subsidy as the copay
increases (falling from 62.9% to 10.4%). The cost per child falls and the total cost
of the child care subsidy program (relative to the simulated cost of the baseline
child care subsidy program) also falls from 1.87 to 0.11 times the total cost of the
baseline program. The total cost subtracts out the copayments from the families
so the decrease in total cost is driven both by less program participation and by
offsetting receipts from higher parental copayments.
Increasing the rate ceiling from $0 to $20 while holding the other param-
eters constant, both the intent to treat parameter on cognitive skills and ma-
ternal labor force participation increase as the rate ceiling increases. Cognitive
skills increase because more children participate and because mothers can accept
higher price/quality child care offers, which also increases the impact on cognitive
achievement. Labor force participation increases because the size of the transfer
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increases. However, at a rate ceiling of $20, both the cost per child, $9,223, and
the total relative cost of the program, 3.7 times the baseline subsidy program,
increase substantially.
Finally, I vary the income cutoff from $5,000 to $30,000 and the intent to treat
on cognitive achievement falls as the income cutoff increases. Higher income fam-
ilies use the subsidy but the mothers were likely already working and using child
care so the child’s cognitive skills do not change, which causes the intent to
treat parameter to decrease. The final row of Table D.6 examines the effect of
a targeted program to very poor mothers (household income less than $10,000
per year) and offers a subsidy with a generous rate ceiling ($20 / hour) and 0%
copay. The results show that this targeted intervention both increases cogni-
tive achievement scores (0.144 SD) and maternal labor supply (0.36 percentage
points). Especially for the very poor there do not appear to be trade-offs between
encouraging maternal labor supply and improving cognitive achievement.
In Table D.5, I explore more in depth how subsidy policy parameters change
the quality of care chosen. The columns supertitled eligibles show the difference
in average child care quality between subsidy users and non-users. For example,
in the program calibrated to national averages, subsidy users had average quality
of 0.06 SD and eligible non-users had average quality of -.02 SD. However, the ∆
Quality column reports that the change in quality is 0 for the subsidy program,
which means that the children who are induced to enter child care by the subsidy
have no better or worse child care quality experiences than average. The subsidy
generates the differences in quality because low-price/low-quality child care users
opt not to use the subsidy and high-price/high-quality child care users elect to
use the subsidy. The subsidy basically segments the mothers into users and non-
users by the price of child care they would have used anyways. The subsidy is
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capable of improving cognitive achievement primarily by encouraging mothers
with low quality home environment to use child care so that their children spend
less time at home. In this model, the conclusion is that to improve cognitive
achievement the subsidies should be targeted toward children with low quality
home environments but that the ability to design the subsidies to improve child
care quality experiences is limited.
In Table D.6, I examine the effect of child care subsidies on the black-white
(BW) achievement gap. Unlike the Head Start example, I consider the impact on
the BW achievement gap average across all periods. The estimated impact is the
ability of a particular configuration of policy parameters to decrease (or increase)
the achievement gap. The first result is that the child care subsidy program has a
very small impact on the BW achievement gap; increasing the gap by 0.4 percent.
I then vary the copay, the rate ceiling and the income cutoffs. The effects are
generally small and range from positive to negative depending on whether the
parameter configuration induces changes more from black or white mothers. The
child care subsidy program targeted to mothers with less than $10,000 annual
income decreases the achievement gap by 1.4 percent. The effect on cognitive
skills for this intervention is large and evidently primarily benefits black children
but the coverage is low so the effect on the black-white gap is relatively small.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
In this paper, I explore the effects of two kinds of child care policies, Head Start
and child care price subsidies, on the cognitive achievement of children and ma-
ternal labor supply. I first use the estimated model to examine the effects of the
existing Head Start program on participants. I find that Head Start is effective
at increasing cognitive achievement (0.15 SD) and when I mimic the design of
a randomized evaluation of Head Start I find similar sized impacts. Replacing
Head Start with cash transfers has a sizable negative impact on cognitive achieve-
ment (-0.13 SD). Expanding Head Start services increases cognitive achievement
at kindergarten entry (0.21 SD for a universal program), primarily because many
non-eligible children spend significant amounts of time in low quality child care.
Child care subsidies, as typically designed, do not have negative impacts on
cognitive achievement. Six months of exposure to a child care subsidy program
increases cognitive achievement by 0.043 standard deviations. Child care subsidy
policy parameters do have an important role in increasing cognitive achievement
but the effect comes through which children participate in child care and not
through the child care quality choices. A generous child care subsidy program
targeted to very poor households (less than $10,000 annual income) both increases
children’s cognitive achievement scores and increases labor force participation
of mothers. For the some families, there are no trade-offs between improving
cognitive skills and increasing labor force participation.
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Appendix A: Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Child care participation 47.1%
Labor force participation women 57.1%
Average hourly wage ($) 21.37
Average income ($) 28,350
Average price child care / hour ($) 4.93
Average number of years of education
Wives 14.37
Husbands 14.46
Average number of years work experience at baseline
Wives 7.01
Husbands 13.07
Age at first birth 27.55
Average number of children 2.04
Percent married 94.5%
Percent black 7.4%
Sample size 3,000
Notes: Income is over 6 month for married men only.
Marriage includes cohabitation. Sample size rounded
to nearest 50 per NCES requirements.
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Table A.2: Home Quality Measurements
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
N = 4350 N = 3800 N = 4200 N = 3200
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Caregiver spoke spontaneously 0.94 0.25 0.98 0.15 . . . .
to child?1
Caregiver responded verbally child?1 0.86 0.34 0.97 0.17 . . . .
Caregiver caressed/kissed/hugged 0.95 0.21 0.95 0.21 . . . .
child?1
Caregiver provided toys to child?1 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.37 . . . .
Caregiver interfered with 0.79 0.41 0.77 0.42 . . . .
child’s actions?1
Caregiver kept child in view?1 0.98 0.15 0.95 0.21 . . . .
Play environment was safe?1 0.97 0.16 0.99 0.11 . . . .
Read books to child?2 2.85 1.01 3.29 0.84 3.23 0.81 3.21 0.81
Tell stories to child?2 2.55 1.12 2.70 1.03 2.71 0.92 2.58 0.89
Sings songs with child?2 3.64 0.70 3.60 0.69 3.28 0.84 3.05 0.92
Talk about books?2 . . . . . . 2.99 0.87
Take on errands?2 3.35 0.88 3.38 0.81 . . . .
Play peek-a-boo?3 5.00 1.14 . . . . . .
Tickle/blow on belly/ 5.78 0.58 . . . . . .
move playfully?3
Walk/yard/park/ 4.15 1.35 . . 3.48 0.99 . .
playground?3
Number soft toys . . 25.34 29.00 . . . .
Number push/pull toys . . 12.54 20.52 . . . .
Number books . . 58.68 52.25 90.32 102.25 103.55 115.67
Number records/tapes/CDs . . 12.85 18.96 . . . .
Zoo, aquarium, or petting farm?1 . . 0.31 0.46 . . . .
Art gallery, museum, . . 0.15 0.36 . . . .
or historical site?1
Visited library?1 . . 0.31 0.46 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.50
Play chasing games?3 . . 3.77 1.04 . . . .
Play with games or toys indoors?3 . . 4.35 0.84 . . . .
Go to a restaurant or out to eat?3 . . 2.18 0.76 . . . .
Affection by hugging, kissing . . 4.86 0.39 4.77 0.50 . .
or holding?4
Easygoing and relaxed . . 4.13 0.82 3.93 0.78 . .
with my child?4
No energy to make child behave?4 . . 3.42 1.14 3.48 1.03 . .
Trouble stick to rules?4 . . 3.73 1.12 3.73 1.08 . .
Hours TV? . . 2.94 8.37 2.12 2.09 1.96 1.97
Number of days dinner together . . 5.96 1.76 5.60 1.77 0.00 0.00
Organized athletic activities?1 . . . . 0.37 0.48 0.51 0.50
Dance lessons?1 . . . . 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39
Music lessons?1 . . . . 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.28
Drama lessons?1 . . . . 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.15
Art classes?1 . . . . 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30
Organized performing arts?1 . . . . 0.17 0.37 0.22 0.42
Craft classes or lessons?1 . . . . 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34
Play together with toys for building?1 . . . . 0.38 0.49 . .
Computer?1 . . . . 0.66 0.47 0.74 0.44
Notes: ‘·’ indicates the question was not asked in that particular round.
Responses were coded as follows:
1No = 0 , Yes = 1
2Number times per week: not at all = 1, once or twice = 2, 3 to 6 times = 3, every day = 4
3How often per month: more than once a day = 1, about once a day = 2, few times a week = 3,
few times a month = 4, rarely = 5, not at all = 6
4Sounds like me? exactly like = 1, very much like = 2, somewhat like = 3, not much like = 4,
not at all like = 5
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Table A.3: Child Care Quality Measurements
Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
N = 1650 N = 2900 N = 700
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Number books 54.50 89.26 110.89 169.35 111.58 164.06
Number records/tapes/CDs 17.53 25.54 . . . .
Number soft toys 21.53 24.27 . . . .
Number push/pull toys 10.70 16.96 . . . .
How often talk to child?1 3.60 0.60 . . . .
Hours of TV? . . 0.47 1.00 4.74 19.79
How often read books to child?2 3.50 0.83 6.34 4.69 5.86 3.86
How often tell stories to child?2 3.06 1.09 4.24 3.63 4.18 3.28
How often sing songs to child?2 3.60 0.76 7.10 6.87 6.46 6.99
Ask questions about story?3 0.91 1.44 3.21 0.85 . .
Play chasing games?4 2.85 1.41 . . . .
Computer? . . 1.39 0.49 1.34 0.47
Play games/puzzles? . . 4.26 3.33 4.11 2.95
Build something? . . 3.55 2.99 3.46 2.72
Walk to yard/park/playground?4 2.14 1.21 . . . .
Visit zoo, aquarium, or petting farm?5 0.12 0.32 . . . .
Visited art gallery, museum, or historical site?5 0.06 0.23 . . . .
Visited library?5 0.14 0.35 . . . .
Reading area?5 . . 0.75 0.43 0.79 0.41
Listening center?5 . . 0.53 0.50 0.62 0.49
Writing center?5 . . 0.71 0.45 0.78 0.42
Pocket board?5 . . 0.62 0.49 . .
Math area?5 . . 0.73 0.45 0.75 0.43
Blocks?5 . . 0.75 0.43 0.78 0.41
Puzzle area?5 . . 0.63 0.48 0.79 0.41
Water area?5 . . 0.70 0.46 0.65 0.48
Drama area?5 . . 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.44
Art area?5 . . 0.52 0.50 0.78 0.42
Private area?5 . . 4.13 1.29 . .
Work on learning names of letters?6 . . 3.46 1.60 4.43 1.01
Practice writing the letters of the alphabet?6 . . 3.95 1.36 3.93 1.21
Discuss new words?6 . . 3.61 1.47 4.24 1.07
Tell stories to a caregiver/teacher/provider?6 . . 4.00 1.38 3.74 1.29
Work on phonics or phonemics?6 . . 4.13 1.29 4.02 1.30
Listen to stories and see print?6 . . 2.18 2.10 4.25 1.15
Listen to stories and don’t see print?6 . . 3.10 1.50 2.90 1.72
Retell stories?6 . . 3.44 1.77 3.32 1.27
Learn about conventions of print?6 . . 3.90 1.55 3.86 1.41
Write own name?6 . . 3.00 1.64 4.44 1.05
Learn about rhyming words and word families?6 . . 4.58 0.89 3.28 1.33
Count out loud?6 . . 3.84 1.39 4.75 0.68
Work with geometric manipulatives?6 . . 3.51 1.64 3.88 1.24
Work with counting manipulatives?6 . . 3.19 1.56 3.86 1.29
Play math-related games?6 . . 2.45 1.80 3.46 1.31
Music for math concepts?6 . . 2.21 1.77 2.78 1.46
Creative movement for math concepts?6 . . 2.41 1.68 2.49 1.43
Work with measuring instruments? 6 . . 3.79 1.84 2.67 1.35
Calendar activities?6 . . 2.20 1.97 4.30 1.34
Telling time activites?6 . . 3.83 1.38 2.88 1.65
Engage with shapes and patterns?6 . . . . 4.08 1.15
Notes: ‘·’ indicates the question was not asked in that particular round.
1Typical day: 1 = Almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = Often, 4 = Always
2Number times per week: 1 = Not at all, 2 = once or twice, 3 = 3 to 6 times, 4 = Every day
3almost never = 1, sometimes = 2, often = 3, always = 4
4more than once a day = 1, about once a day = 2, few times a week = 3, few times a month = 4,
rarely = 5, not at all = 6
5No = 0 , Yes = 1
6never = 0, once a month = 1, 2 or 3 times per month = 2, 1 or 2 a week = 3,
3 or 4 times a week = 4, everyday = 5
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Table A.4: Sample Selection Criteria
% of baseline
N sample
Baseline sample 10,700 100%
Exclusion criteria
Half/step siblings in house 3,250 30.3%
Age birth less than 20, greater than 40 2,750 25.7%
More than two children less than age 5 2,250 21%
Child has a twin 1,650 15.4%
Subsidy recipient 1,250 11.7%
Families with step-fathers and 950 8.9%
non-biological father figures
Biological father exits/re-enters household 600 5.6%
Drop American Indian/Alaskan Natives 300 2.8%
Union of exclusion criteria 7,700 72%
Estimation Sample 3,000 28%
Notes: Per NCES requirements, sample sizes are rounded to the nearest
50. The ECLS-B originally sampled 14,000 birth certificates but only 10,700
entered the first wave of the study. This table presents the effect of the
sample selection criteria on the size of the baseline study entrants.
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Appendix B: Functional Forms
Utility:
U(Ct + Cmin(1−Mt), θ1c,t, θ2c,t, hL,t, h1cc,t, h2cc,t, L,t, cc,t) =
(Ct + Cmin(1−Mt))1−γ
1− γ + Consumption
(φL,0K,O,M + φ
L,1hL,t + L,t)hL,t + φ
L,2|hL,t − hL,t−1|+ Leisure
+ φL,31{hL,t 6=0}
2∑
i=1
(φcc,0A,q + cc,t)h
i
cc,t + φ
cc,1|hicc,t − hicc,t−1|+ Hours of Care
φcc,2M (hw,t − hicc,t)1{hw,t>hicc,t}
2∑
i=1
φcθ
i
c,t Cognitive Skills
Utility parameter heterogeneity:
φL,0K,O,M = φ
L,0
0 + φ
L,0
1 Kt + φ
L,0
2 Ot + φ
L,0
3 Mt
φcc,0A,q = φ
cc,0
0 + φ
cc,0
1 A
i
t + φ
cc,0
2 qcc,t
φcc,2M = φ
cc,2
0 + φ
cc,2
1 Mt
Hedonic pricing equation:
pcc,t = (γ
p
0 + γ
p
1qcc,t + p,t)1{γp0 + γp1qcc,t + p,t > 0}
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Head Start access:
H it = 1{HS ≤ γHS}1{Ait ∈ [3, 5]}
1{ItMt + wt(1000− hL,t) < IHS(1 +Mt +Kt +Ot)}
HS ∼ U [0, 1]
Home quality:
log(qh,t) =
1∑
k=0
φqh,type k1{type = k}) + qh,t
Production Function:
θic,t+1 = (
1∑
k=0
γw0,type k1{type = k})(θic,t)γ
c
1(I it)
γc3e
i
c,t Production Function
I it = (2000− hicc,t)qh,t + αhicc,tq¯icc,t Input
Chosen Child Care Quality:
q¯icc,t = qcc,t(1−H itDiHS,t) + qHS,t1{hicc,t = 500}H itDiHS,t+
(.5qHS,t + .5qcc,t)1{hicc,t = 1000}H itDiHS,t
Wage offer function:
log(wt) =
1∑
k=0
γw0,type k1{type = k}+ γw1 black + γw2 Ew + γw3 Xw,t+
γw4 X
2
w,t + µw + w,t
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Husband’s income:
log(It) =
1∑
k=0
γh0,type k1{type = k}+ γh1 black + γh2Eh + γh3Xh,t+
γh4X
2
h,t + µI + I,t
Probability of a birth:
P (Kt+1 = Kt + 1|Xbt ) =
1
1 + exp(−Xbtφb)
P (Kt+1 = Kt + 1|Xbt , Kt = 2) = 0
Xbtφ
b =φb0 + φ
b
1Ew + φ
b
2black + φ
b
3t+ φ
b
4Mt+
φb5EhMt + φ
b
6Xh,tMt + φ
b
7Kt + φ
b
8Ot
Evolution of age, younger and older children:
Ait+1 = A
i
t + .5
Ot+1 = Ot + 1{A1t > 5}+ 1{A2t > 5}
Kt+1 = Kt − 1{A1t > 5} − 1{A2t > 5}+ 1{b ≤ P (Kt+1 = Kt + 1|Xbt )}
b ∼ U(0, 1)
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Probability of a divorce:
P (Mt+1 = 0|Mt = 1, Xdt ) =
1
1 + exp(−Xdt φd)
P (Mt+1 = 1|Mt = 0) = 0
Xdt φ
d = φd0 + φ
d
1Ew + φ
d
3black + φ
d
4t+ φ
d
5Eh + φ
d
6Xh,t + φ
d
7Kt + φ
d
8Ot
Evolution of marriage:
Mt+1 = Mt − 1{d ≤ P (Mt+1 = 0|Mt, Xdt )}
d ∼ U(0, 1)
State space:
Ωt ={Xf,t, Ef , Xm,t, Em, black, hL,t−1, h1cc,t−1, h2cc,t−1, A1t , A2t , Ot,
Mt, θ
1
c,tθ
2
c,t, θ
T
c,t, qcc,t, pcc,t, qHS,t, H
1
t , H
2
t , 
1
c,t, 
2
c,t, qh,t, L,t, cc,t, w,t, I,t}
Unobserved heterogeneity:
Pr(type = 1|Z0) = 1
1 + exp(−Z0βtype)
Pr(type = 2|Z0) = 1− Pr(type = 1|Z0)
with
Z0βtype = β0,type + β1,typeblack + β2,typeEw + β3,typet0+
β4,typeM0 + β5,typeM0Eh + β6,typeM0Xh,0
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Appendix C: Parameters and Model Fit
Table C.1: Parameter Estimates
Description Parameter Estimate Standard Error
Utility
CRRA γ 0.952 * 0.051
Utility cognitive skills φc 0.015 0.05
Utility leisure φL0 0.002 0.022
Diminishing returns to leisure φL1 -0.24 0.215
Leisure X younger children φL01 0.013 0.191
Leisure X older children φL02 0.008 0.096
Leisure X marital status φL03 0.007 0.088
Switching costs leisure φL2 -1.8 * 0.879
Fixed cost of working φL3 -0.014 0.098
Variance leisure shock σ2L 2.991 1.759
Utility child care φcc00 -0.882 * 0.226
Utility child care X child age φcc01 0.021 0.032
Utility child care X quality φcc02 0.002 0.043
Switching costs child care φcc1 -0.583 * 0.226
Disutility work and no care φcc20 -1.713 * 0.449
Disutility work and no care X divorced φcc21 -0.324 0.612
Variance child care utility shock σ2cc 2.55 * 1.212
Continuation value cognitive skills Ac 2.046 2.055
Continuation value mother experience Aw 0.003 0.071
Discount factor β 0.9 * 0.095
% transfered to wife τ0 0.991 1
% transfered to wife X black τ1 0.957 0.99
Cognitive achievement production function
Intecept type 0 γc0,type 0 0.053 0.032
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Intercept type 1 γc0,type 1 0.01 0.012
Value-added γc1 0.792 * 0.107
Share parameter α 0.586 0.392
Scale parameter γc3 0.428 * 0.089
Variance of cognitive skill shock σ2c 0 0.008
Child care quality offer distribution
Mean quality µccq 0.051 0.146
Variance quality σ2ccq 0.65 * 0.166
Hedonic equation
Hedonic intercept γp0 4.091 * 0.999
Hedonic quality γp1 0.257 0.562
Hedonic shock variance σ2p 15.35 * 2.893
Head Start
Mean HS quality µHSq 0.697 0.623
Variance HS quality σ2HSq 0.16 0.229
Probability Head Start Offer γHS 0.744 0.699
Home quality
Intercept type 0 φqh,type 0 -0.856 * 0.367
Intercept type 1 φqh,type 1 1.087 * 0.375
Variance home quality shock σ2qh 0.808 0.423
Wage offer equation
Intercept type 0 γw0,type 0 0.001 0.018
Intercept type 1 γw0,type 1 0.555 0.309
Black γw1 -0.034 0.355
Returns to education γw2 0.127 * 0.019
Variance wage shock σ2w 0.049 0.084
Income equation
Intercept type 0 γh0,type 0 7.315 * 0.687
Intercept type 1 γh0,type 1 0.86 0.502
Black γh1 -0.169 0.472
Returns to education γh2 0.109 * 0.042
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Returns to experience γh3 0.113 * 0.041
Diminishing returns to experience γh4 -0.004 * 0.001
Variance income shock σ2I 0.009 0.023
Divorce logit
Intercept φd0 -3.776 6.549
Mother education φd1 -0.034 0.11
Black φd2 0.098 0.528
Mother age φd3 0.034 0.051
Father education φd4 -0.332 0.579
Father experience φd5 -0.014 0.069
Number younger kids φd6 0.595 1.035
Number older kids φd7 0.713 0.569
Fertility logit
Intercept φb0 -1.524 * 0.349
Mother education φb1 -0.001 0.006
Black φb2 -0.043 0.561
Mother age φb3 -0.008 0.012
Father education X marital status φb4 0.001 0.008
Number of younger kids φb5 0.001 0.011
Number of older kids φb6 -0.154 0.134
Type probability
Intercept β0type -2.75 * 1.166
Black β1type -0.037 8.54
Mother education β2type 0.136 0.115
Mother age at first birth β3type 0.05 0.071
Initial marital status β4type 0.32 0.673
Father education X marital status β5type 0.059 0.076
Father initial experience X marital status β6type -0.048 0.072
Notes: * indicates statistically significant at the 5% level. There are 73 parameters.
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Table C.2: Ancillary Statistics
Elasticities
Wage Elasticity of Labor Supply (intensive) 0.92
Wage Elasticity of Labor Supply (extensive) 0.88
Cognitive skills
Intra-sibling correlation in cognitive skills 0.49
Average cognitive skills by birth order:
Family size
Birth order Unconditional 1 2 3
First born -0.02 0.17 0.2 -0.1
Second born -0.07 - 0.15 -0.15
Third born -0.2 - - -0.2
Notes: The wage elasiticty considers the average change in labor force participation
given a 5% increase in the wage in every period for every woman. The estimated
elasticity is uncompensated.
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MODEL FIT
Table C.3: Basic Statistics
Data Model
Average Cognitive Skills 0.00 0.01
Average Home Quality 1.38 1.44
Average Child Care Quality 1.41 1.45
Average Price Child Care / Hour ($) 4.39 4.47
Percent Full Time Child Care 0.33 0.34
Percent Part Time Child Care 0.14 0.10
% in Head Start 0.04 0.02
Average Head Start Quality 2.30 2.27
Percent Full Time Labor 0.44 0.44
Percent Part Time Labor 0.09 0.12
Average Female Wage ($) 21.76 23.03
Average Husband Income ($) 28,767 29,156
% Labor Force Participation 0.57 0.56
% Child Care Participation 0.46 0.44
% Married 0.95 0.95
Average Number Younger Children 1.53 1.53
Average Number Older Children 0.39 0.39
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MODEL FIT: Cognitive Skills
Table C.4: Average Cognitive Skills By Household Characteristics
Data Model
Married 0.02 0.03
Single -0.39 -0.39
White 0.10 0.03
Black -0.32 -0.21
Mother less than H.S. -0.43 -0.37
Mother H.S. -0.28 -0.18
Mother Some college -0.10 -0.04
Mother College+ 0.26 0.19
Standard deviation 1.00 0.94
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MODEL FIT: Child Care Participation
Table C.5: % in Child Care By Household Characteristics
Data Model
Married 0.45 0.44
Single 0.59 0.37
White 0.47 0.44
Black 0.53 0.43
Mother less than H.S. 0.27 0.24
Mother H.S. 0.41 0.33
Mother Some college 0.44 0.41
Mother College+ 0.54 0.54
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MODEL FIT: Child Care Quality
Table C.6: Average Child Care Quality By Household Characteristics
Data Model
Married 1.40 1.44
Single 1.50 1.52
White 1.39 1.44
Black 1.65 1.45
Mother less than H.S. 1.48 1.54
Mother H.S. 1.46 1.49
Mother Some college 1.28 1.41
Mother College+ 1.46 1.45
MODEL FIT: Child Care Price
Table C.7: Average Child Care Price By Household Characteristics
Married 4.46 4.51
Single 2.92 3.52
White 4.61 4.49
Black 3.77 4.20
Mother less than H.S. 2.49 3.64
Mother H.S. 3.10 4.11
Mother Some college 3.73 4.48
Mother College+ 5.11 4.62
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MODEL FIT: Head Start
Table C.8: Head Start Participation By Household Characteristics
Data Model
Average Head Start Quality 2.30 2.27
SD Quality 0.99 1.00
Married 0.04 0.02
Single 0.11 0.16
White 0.03 0.02
Black 0.09 0.06
Mother less than H.S. 0.10 0.11
Mother H.S. 0.08 0.05
Mother Some college 0.05 0.01
Mother College+ 0.01 0.00
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MODEL FIT: Home Quality
Table C.9: Average Home Quality By Household Characteristics
Data Model
Married 1.40 1.46
Single 1.03 1.18
White 1.50 1.45
Black 1.09 1.31
Mother less than H.S. 0.74 1.12
Mother H.S. 1.10 1.22
Mother Some college 1.33 1.38
Mother College+ 1.65 1.64
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MODEL FIT: Labor Force Participation
Table C.10: % in Labor Force By Household Characteristics
Data Model
Married 0.57 0.56
Single 0.59 0.56
White 0.58 0.56
Black 0.64 0.60
Mother less than H.S. 0.36 0.38
Mother H.S. 0.50 0.46
Mother Some college 0.59 0.53
Mother College+ 0.63 0.66
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MODEL FIT: Distribution and Transition of Decisions
Table C.11
Distribution of Care/Work Decisions: Data, Model
Round T
Round T No Work Part-Time Work Full-Time Work
No Child Care 0.38 , 0.41 0.04 , 0.04 0.11 , 0.11
Part-Time Child Care 0.05 , 0.01 0.03 , 0.07 0.05 , 0.02
Full-Time Child Care 0.03 , 0.02 0.00 , 0.01 0.27 , 0.31
Child Care Transition Between Rounds: Data, Model
Round T
Round T-1 No Care Part-Time Care Full-Time Care
No Child Care 0.67 , 0.67 0.16 , 0.09 0.17 , 0.24
Part-Time Child Care 0.28 , 0.26 0.33 , 0.47 0.39 , 0.27
Full-Time Child Care 0.20 , 0.25 0.09 , 0.06 0.71 , 0.69
Work Transition Between Rounds: Data, Model
Round T
Round T-1 No Work Part-Time Work Full-Time Work
No Work 0.78 , 0.75 0.07 , 0.09 0.15 , 0.16
Part-Time Work 0.26 , 0.03 0.39 , 0.73 0.35 , 0.24
Full-Time Work 0.13 , 0.02 0.05 , 0.02 0.82 , 0.96
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MODEL FIT: Wages
Table C.12
Average Wage By Mother’s Characteristics
Data Model
Married 22.17 23.35
Single 13.82 16.44
White 23.66 23.32
Black 17.21 19.14
Mother less than H.S. 9.31 9.13
Mother H.S. 12.45 12.66
Mother Some college 16.94 17.3
Mother College+ 29.14 30.41
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MODEL FIT: Income
Table C.13
Average Income By Father’s Characteristics
Data Model
White 31,890 29,815
Black 21,064 19,728
Father less than H.S. 12,128 11,003
Father H.S. 18,978 17,370
Father Some college 23,697 23,919
Father College+ 39,430 41,568
Father Experience 0-5 18,732 25,030
Father Experience 5-10 24,979 31,687
Father Experience 10-15 31,662 36,692
Father Experience 15-20 31,721 33,012
Father Experience 20-25 26,227 24,995
Father Experience 25+ 21,636 10,154
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MODEL FIT: Number of Younger Children
Table C.14
Average Number of Younger Children By Household Characteristics
Data Model
Married 1.53 1.53
Single 1.47 1.50
White 1.54 1.53
Black 1.48 1.54
Mother less than H.S. 1.47 1.54
Mother H.S. 1.52 1.54
Mother Some college 1.54 1.53
Mother College+ 1.53 1.53
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Figure F.1
Younger Children By Mother’s Age
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MODEL FIT: Number of Older Children
Table C.15
Average Number of Older Children By Household Characteristics
Data Model
Married 0.38 0.36
Single 0.62 0.93
White 0.34 0.37
Black 0.63 0.57
Mother less than H.S. 0.60 0.57
Mother H.S. 0.49 0.49
Mother Some college 0.44 0.43
Mother College+ 0.27 0.28
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Figure F.2:
Older Children By Mother’s Age
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MODEL FIT: Marriage
Table C.16
Percent Married By Household Characteristics
Data Model
White 0.97 0.97
Black 0.72 0.73
Mother less than H.S. 0.88 0.86
Mother H.S. 0.91 0.92
Mother Some college 0.94 0.94
Mother College+ 0.99 0.99
Figure F.3:
Percent Married By Mother’s Age
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Figure F.4:
Cognitive Gaps by Maternal Education and Child’s Age
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Figure F.5:
Cognitive Gaps by Child’s Age and Race
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Figure F.6:
Average Child Care Quality by Child’s Age and Race
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Appendix D: Counterfactuals
Table D.1: Model Validation: Model Experiment vs. Head Start Impact Study (HSIS)
Intent to Treat Treatment on the Treated
Model HSIS Model HSIS
∆ Cognitive ∆ Cognitive ∆ Cognitive ∆ Cognitive
Design
HSIS 4 year olds 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.17
HSIS 3 year olds 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.06
Notes: ∆ Cognitive reports change in cognitive achievement at kindergarten entry for
the model simulations (Model) and from impacts reported in the Head Start Impact
Study (HSIS). The two columns supertitled Intent to Treat report the average change
in cognitive achievement at kindergarten entry of being Head Start eligible (in the
model) and the average change in cognitive skills at kindergarten entry for children
who were offered Head Start services (in the HSIS). The two columns supertitled
Treatment on the Treated report the average change in cognitive achievement at
kindergarten entry of using Head Start (in the model) and the Bloom adjusted Intent
to Treat estimate (in the HSIS). The column label Design refers to the two arms of
randomization in the HSIS. The 4 year old cohort was a group of children randomized
to receive Head Start or not at 4 years old. The 3 year old cohort consisted of a
treatment and a delayed treatment control starting at 4 years old. I implement these
design features in the model simulations by removing Head Start from the choice set
for 4 year olds in the control counterfactual for the HS Impact Study 4 year olds
design and by removing Head Start from the choice set of 3 year olds in the control
counterfactual for the HS Impact Study 3 year olds design.
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Table D.2: Head Start Counterfactuals
Intent to Treat Cost Per Total Relative
Head Start (HS) Counterfactual ∆ Cog ∆ LFP Take-up Child Cost
1. Remove Head Start -0.15 -0.03 - - 1
1. Remove HS: Cash Transfer $7,220 -0.13 -0.10 100% $7,220 3.7
2. HS Income Cutoff: +$10,000 0.13 0.02 42.8% $7,220 3.4
3. HS Income Cutoff: +$20,000 0.16 0.03 47.9% $7,220 5.8
4. HS Income Cutoff: +$40,000 0.18 0.02 50.1% $7,220 9.6
5. HS Income Cutoff: Universal 0.21 0.02 55.6% $7,220 14.9
Notes: ∆ Cognitive and ∆ LFP are the average differences across treatment and baseline in
cognitive skills and labor force participation for the Head Start eligible population (Intent
to Treat). Take-up is the percentage using Head Start among eligibles. Cost per child is
the average cost per child per year, which I set to $7, 220. The Head Start cash transfer is
a six-month transfer that is half of the yearly cost per child in Head Start ($7, 220). Total
Cost is the total cost per year for the different Head Start program configurations relative
to the total simulated cost of the baseline Head Start program.
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Table D.3: The Effect of Head Start Policies on the Black-White (BW)
Achievement Gap
%∆ in
BW Gap BW Gap
Baseline gap at kindergarten entry -0.296
Head Start Counterfactuals
1. Remove HS -0.324 -9.66
2. Remove HS: Cash Transfer $3610 -0.307 -3.95
3. HS Income Cutoff: +$10000 -0.27 8.51
4. HS Income Cutoff: +$20,000 -0.267 9.78
5. HS Income Cutoff: +$40,000 -0.284 3.82
6. HS Income Cutoff: Universal -0.331 -12.11
Notes: The Head Start counterfactuals are relative to closing the black-
white achievement gap at kindergarten entry. The column %∆ in
BW Achievement Gap reports the percent change in the counterfac-
tual black-white achievement gap relative to the simulated baseline
black-white achievement gap for the Head Start counterfactuals.
91
Table D.4: Subsidy Counterfactuals I
Intent to Treat Total Cost
Income Rate Cost Per Relative to
Cutoff Ceiling Copay ∆ Cognitive ∆ LFP Take-Up Child ($) Baseline
Baseline
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 9% 0.037 0.11 40.8 % 4,104 1
Vary Copay
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 0% 0.063 0.17 62.9 % 4,586 1.87
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 10% 0.037 0.1 39.6 % 3,960 0.93
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 20% 0.023 0.06 23.6 % 2,757 0.36
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 30% 0.016 0.04 10.4 % 1,854 0.11
Vary Rate Ceiling
$ 15,000 $ 1 9% 0.002 0.01 6.3 % 376 0.01
$ 15,000 $ 5 9% 0.045 0.14 44.9 % 5,353 1.49
$ 15,000 $ 10 9% 0.082 0.2 55.3 % 8,283 3.13
$ 15,000 $ 20 9% 0.086 0.23 56.3 % 9,223 3.7
Vary Income Cutoff
$ 5,000 $ 3.9 9% 0.094 0.22 29.6 % 4,085 0.08
$ 10,000 $ 3.9 9% 0.052 0.14 34 % 4,228 0.39
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 9% 0.037 0.11 40.8 % 4,104 1
$ 30,000 $ 3.9 9% 0.027 0.09 43.8 % 3,510 2.6
Targeted to Very Poor
$ 5,000 $ 20 0% 0.144 0.36 65.6 % 8,323 0.49
The child care subsidy policy parameters are calibrated to averages across state level policy
parameters. I use $15,000 for the income cutoff, $3.90 for the rate ceiling and 9% for the
copay. ∆ Cognitive and ∆ LFP are the average differences across treatment and baseline in
cognitive skills and labor force participation for the subsidy eligible population regardless of
subsidy use (Intent to Treat). Take-up is the percentage using subsidies among the subsidy
eligible population. Cost per child is the average subsidy payment per child per year net of
copayments paid by the family. The total cost is the total cost per year net of copayments
relative to the total simulated cost of the baseline subsidy program.
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Table D.5: Subsidy Counterfactuals II
Intent to Treat Eligibles
Income Rate Quality: Quality:
Cutoff Ceiling Copay ∆ Cognitive ∆ Quality ∆ CCP Users Non-Users
Baseline
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 9 % 0.037 0 0.15 0.06 -0.02
Vary Copay
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 0 % 0.063 0.01 0.24 0.05 -
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 10 % 0.037 0.01 0.14 0.06 -0.02
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 20 % 0.023 0 0.08 0.06 0.02
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 30 % 0.016 0 0.05 0.03 0.03
Vary Rate Ceiling
$ 15,000 $ 1 9 % 0.002 0 0.01 -0.04 0.05
$ 15,000 $ 5 9 % 0.045 0.01 0.19 0.06 -0.03
$ 15,000 $ 10 9 % 0.082 0.02 0.3 0.08 -0.02
$ 15,000 $ 20 9 % 0.086 0.01 0.32 0.07 -0.02
Vary Income Cutoff
$ 5,000 $ 3.9 9 % 0.094 0.02 0.26 0.04 -0.08
$ 10,000 $ 3.9 9 % 0.052 -0.01 0.19 0.06 0
$ 15,000 $ 3.9 9 % 0.037 0 0.15 0.06 -0.02
$ 30,000 $ 3.9 9 % 0.027 0 0.1 0.07 -0.01
The child care subsidy policy parameters are calibrated to averages across state level policy
parameters. I use $15,000 for the income cutoff, $3.90 for the rate ceiling and 9% for the
copay. ∆ Cognitive, ∆ Quality and ∆ CCP are the average differences across treatment and
baseline in cognitive skills, child care quality and child care participation for the subsidy
eligible population (Intent to Treat). The two columns supertitled Eligibles shows the
average quality for eligible subsidy users and eligible subsidy non-users.
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Table D.6: The Effect of Child Care Subsidies on the Black-White (BW)
Achievement Gap
Baseline Black-White Achievement Gap -0.2078
%∆
Income Cutoff Rate Ceiling Copay BW Gap BW Gap
Baseline
$15000 $3.9 9% -0.2086 -0.4
Vary Copay
$15,000 $3.9 0% -0.2102 -1.2
$15,000 $3.9 10% -0.2068 0.5
$15,000 $3.9 20% -0.2064 0.6
$15,00 $3.9 30% -0.2069 0.4
Vary Rate Ceiling
$15,000 $1 9% -0.2083 -0.3
$15,000 $5 9% -0.2108 -1.4
$15,000 $10 9% -0.2052 1.3
$15,000 $20 9% -0.2062 0.8
Vary Income Cutoff
$5,000 $3.9 9% -0.2062 0.8
$10,000 $3.9 9% -0.2071 0.4
$15,000 $3.9 9% -0.2086 -0.4
$30,000 $3.9 9% -0.2087 -0.4
Targeted to Very Poor
$5,000 $20 0% -0.2042 1.7
Notes: The subsidy counterfactuals are relative to closing the black-
white achievement gap averaged across all periods. The difference be-
tween the two numbers reflects the gradual opening of the black-white
achievement gap. In the column %∆ in BW Achievement Gap, I re-
port the percent change in the counterfactual black-white achievement
gap relative to the simulated baseline black-white achievement gap for
subsidy counterfactuals.
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